DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 284 944 UD 025 718

AUTHOR Jorge, Antonio; Moncarz, Raul
TITLE The Political Economy of Cubans in South Florida. A Cuban Studies Project Monograph.
INSTITUTION Miami Univ., FL. Inst. of Interamerican Studies.
PUB DATE Mar 87
NOTE 57p.
AVAILABLE FROM Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, P.O. Box 248123, Coral Gables, FL 33124 ($5.00).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Acculturation; Activism; *Cubans; Demography; Economic Opportunities; Elementary Secondary Education; Hispanic Americans; *Immigrants; Refugees; *Social Integration; Social Mobility; *Socioeconomic Status
IDENTIFIERS *Florida (Dade County); Mariel Cubans

ABSTRACT

This paper presents and analyzes data on the experience of the Cuban community in South Florida, from its inception as a reaction to the revolution of 1959 through its gradual accommodation to the reality of permanent exile and its altered view of its own future. First, the paper examines the changing demographics of South Florida and how these have altered the nature of the local markets and society. The varying motivations for Cuban immigration to the Miami area are outlined and characteristics of the different waves of Cuban migration are compared, particularly the propensity for occupational mobility in the new environment and factors contributing to that mobility. Economic discrimination is discussed as a possible element in downward mobility of the refugees; while Cuban income and formal education are at present above average for Hispanic groups and Blacks, this advantage is said to be gradually eroding. The rapid assimilation of the Mariel refugees into the Miami Cuban community is analyzed, and Cuban progress in penetrating local political structures and participation in politics is surveyed. The initial lag of Cuban representation in this area is reported to be disappearing, at least at State and local levels. In conclusion, major findings are summarized and calls for further research, especially on education, are made. This report includes 3 demographic tables, and 5 more are appended. (KH)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

8/6/87

ED284944

Institute of Interamerican Studies

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUBANS IN SOUTH FLORIDA

ANTONIO JORGE and RAUL MONCARZ

A Cuban Studies Project Monograph

March 1987

US025718

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Jaime Suchlicki
Univ. of Miami

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

Graduate School
of International Studies
University of Miami

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUBANS IN SOUTH FLORIDA

ANTONIO JORGE and RAUL MONCARZ

A Cuban Studies Project Monograph

March 1987

THE CUBAN STUDIES PROJECT

This publication is part of an ongoing program of Cuban Studies at the Institute of Interamerican Studies. The project is supported through a generous private grant. The donor, who has asked to remain anonymous, has made this grant to increase awareness of her native country, its society, and its culture.

Institute of Interamerican Studies, Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Miami, Box 248123, Coral Gables, FL 33124 (305) 284-4303

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Copyright 1987 by the University of Miami
Published by the North-South Center, University of Miami, for the Institute of Interamerican Studies.

All rights reserved. No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the publisher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Prologue 1

I.
Introduction 2

II.
Overview of the Cuban Influx
Since 1959: Demographic and
Motivational Analysis 3

III.
Characteristics of the Miami-Cuban
Economy Before and After
the Revolution 7

IV.
The Arrival of the Exiles to Miami 18

V.
Occupational Mobility 18

VI.
Discrimination and the Future of Human Capital 23

VII.
The Mariel Refugees 25

VIII.
Cubans and The Political System 27

VIII.
Conclusions 31

Appendix 33

Endnotes 38

References 41

PROLOGUE

IN THIS STUDY WE HAVE tried to present a comprehensive study of the Cuban community in South Florida. Formal academic research of the Cuban population here is in its infancy. Very few studies have been undertaken at all, and, of these, even fewer have attempted to cover all aspects of Cuban life in the United States, or even in discrete geographic areas.

Cubans, as do other ethnic minorities, need to understand their own position in the larger society. Because the social experience of an individual is conditioned by society's perception of his/her ethnic and cultural background, the individual's future is linked to those who share the common heritage. For groups which lie outside the mainstream culture, the group outlook and group experience become the guides to proper functioning of group members as individuals. After all, social functioning does not take place in a vacuum. The actual experience of many ethnic minorities in the United States confirms the importance of the group as mediating agency for incorporation into the larger society. Only by understanding the position of the group, and the nature and direction of the forces molding their future, can group members--in this case, Cubans--hope to become the conscious subjects of their own history.

We wish to note that we have drawn considerably on our own previous research in compiling this study, full reference to which can be found at the end of the article.

Antonio Jorge
Raul Moncarz

INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE OF THIS MONOGRAPH is to examine certain aspects of the Cuban experience in Miami (Florida), from 1959 to date. This study pursues two fundamental objectives: first, that of determining the present socioeconomic and political position of the Cuban community within the larger social map of South Florida; and, second, that of assessing the future of that community in the light of current trends. Following from, and as a corollary to, these observations, the authors then suggest certain changes that need to be made if the Cuban community is to avoid certain undesirable developments that now appear likely in the future.

The paper begins by examining the changing demographics of South Florida and how these have altered the nature of the local markets and society. This is accompanied by a brief outline of the varying motivations which brought the Cuban immigrants to the United States, particularly the Miami area. Next the different waves of Cuban migration are discussed, their characteristics, particularly the propensity for occupational mobility in the new environment, and factors contributing to that mobility. In this connection, intermediate variables, such as descriptive traits of the immigrant groups, are considered as possible determinants of occupational mobility.

An important exogenous element, i.e. economic discrimination, comes in for discussion as a possible element in downward mobility of the refugees. In the process the authors focus upon the Cuban population as human capital as a key to understanding their performance in the host society. This is in keeping with the emphasis that contemporary literature on growth and development places on new physical capital. The Cuban situation provides an excellent case history in which to test such theories.

The Mariel refugees, who arrived in 1980, are discussed in light of their impact upon the local economy as well as their rapid assimilation into it. Some of the myths surrounding the arrival of this group are mentioned and, hopefully, exploded. A socio-economic analysis of the motivations of the *Mariel group* would provide a most interesting addition to the socio-psychological literature on this subject, which flourished in the fifties and sixties.

Finally, Cuban progress in penetrating local political structures and participation in politics is surveyed. The initial lag of Cuban representation in this area seems to be disappearing, at least in terms of state and local politics. As the Cuban community has acquired greater familiarity with the local political process and become increasingly integrated into the host society, the gap between economic progress and political representation is gradually being loosed. A brief summary of the major findings concludes this study.

OVERVIEW OF THE CUBAN INFLUX INTO SOUTH FLORIDA SINCE 1959: DEMOGRAPHIC AND MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS

IT IS NOW MORE THAN 25 years since the exodus of Cubans from their native land into the United States began, in 1959, a migration that was only to swell and grow in the years that followed. By far, the vast majority settled in South Florida where they have come to affect the socio-economic fabric of the area in significant ways and to make major contributions and changes in the local society.

After this passage of time, there has begun to emerge a resurgence of interest in this community-within-a-community, to assess its status and to examine its origins. Contributing to this renewal of interest has been a more recent (1980) second wage of immigration from Cuba, together with a small, steady, but equally significant, migration of Haitians into the same area, which have combined to raise the distinction between political and economic refugees as an issue for debate.

Prior to 1959, Cubans had never migrated to any country, including the United States, in large numbers, with the possible exception of the period of the Cuban Wars of Independence during the latter part of the nineteenth century. However, in 1959 Cuba experienced a violent political upheaval which overturned the existing regime and ushered in a period of political and economic revolution unlike anything in its previous history. As the extent of this revolutionary change became increasingly apparent, the exodus of Cubans from their homeland to the nearest country of refuge assumed dramatic proportions.

In 1960, the US Census recorded 124,416 Cubans in the country, of whom the greater part (79,156) were born in Cuba and the remainder (45,266) were considered Cuban-American. How many Cuban natives were living in the United States prior to 1959? Let us hazard a rough estimate. From 1959-1962 the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami registered a total of 153,534 persons. If we make a conservative estimate that only about 40,000 Cubans entered the US in 1959 alone and subtract that from the 1960 Census figure, we are left with a figure of approximately another 40,000 native-born Cubans living in the United States prior to the onset of the Cuban Revolution.

Some idea of the extent to which this number escalated in the decade following can be had to be comparing the figures from the 1960 Census with that of 1970, when the number of Cubans in the United States had jumped to 560,628. If we then assume a modest 10% margin for error, to compensate for the chronic census undercount of minorities, it is highly possible that, in actuality, this figure was probably closer to 625,000 Cubans (including (Cuban-Americans). It is probable that even this estimate also may be too low, given the variety of legal status under which Cubans entered the country.

When we then look ahead to the 1979 US Census, we see that this number increases even further, as 794,000 Cubans were recorded. If we add to this the Mariel population, who arrived in the Spring of 1980, and apply the above-mentioned compensating factor of 10%, it is possible that the number of Cubans now in the United States (1986) is at least a million.

Why did they come? We know, of course, that the 1959 Revolution was the catalyst which set the great migration in motion, but, within this explanatory umbrella, what were the *specific* motivations? Some information has gradually been assembled by various scholars with a special interest in the subject, on the basis of a combination of empirical evidence, personal testimony, and overt behavior (Clark, 1975, 1978:1-36, and 1980; Lasaga, 1979; Fagen, Brody, and O'Leary, 1968: 4-5, 73, and 93; Casal and Hernandez, 1975: 26). From the first group of refugees to arrive in the United States, some seven different reasons for leaving have been identified:

(1) temporary imprisonment;
(2) fear or threat of imprisonment;
(3) harassment and persecution;
(4) forcible attempts at integration into the revolution;
(5) loss of job, possessions, or sources of income;
(6) disagreement with government action perceived as arbitrary;
(7) refusal to accept a communist regime.

Balbona (1970) later compared the answers given in a survey taken in 1961 with those of a comparable group of refugees taken in 1970, and he discovered that the later group cited political divergence and personal security to a much lesser degree but cited great concern with economic scarcities as a new factor. Another scholar, in a similar study, appeared to confirm this in his statement that

> the Cuban migration to the US is not only an entirely political phenomenon but, rather, that a significant number of the refugees are traditional immigrants who came to the United States in search of a higher standard of living (Wong, 1973).

Other relevant literature presents the Cuban exodus as resulting from a number of causes (Jorge and Moncarz, 1980: 38-39). One influential variable not discussed in the literature is the attraction of, if not psychological dependence upon, mainstream US cultural values on the part of large sectors of the Cuban population. Yet another influential factor was undoubtedly the attitude of the US government itself, which sought to discredit the Castro regime by calling attention to the number of Cubans fleeing the island. Without the help and support of the US Government, the number of Cuban refugees would certainly have been less (Moncarz and Jorge, 1982).

Table 1 shows Cuban immigration into the United States, from its inception in 1959 through the influx from Mariel in 1980, divided into six stages, which correspond to the various periods in US-Cuban relations during the period. Since the data comes from the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami, the number of refugees registered there falls considerably short of the total number of Cuban immigrants, particularly those using other points of entry into the country. In addition, many refugees did not register with the Center, nor does the data include the natural increase of the population.

TABLE 1

Registrations - Miami Cuban Refugee Center by Stages

	Number of Refugees Registered	Number of Refugees Resettled
First Stage:		
Commercial flights available (to October 22, 1962)	153,534	58,361
Second Stage:		
No Cuba-U.S. air flights (October 23, 1962-November 30, 1965)	29,962	46,547
Third Stage:		
Cuban Refugee Airlift in Operation (December 1, 1965-December 31, 1972)	268,040[a]	203,890
Fourth Stage:		
Third country arrivals and other arrivals (April 1973-September 1978)	17,899	1,436
Fifth Stage:		
Ex-political prisoners/families arrivals and other arrivals (October 1978-March 31, 1981)	24,811	3,397
Sixth Stage:		
Mariel Refugees (April 1980-September 1980)	125,000[b]	25,000[c]
TOTALS	529,246[d]	328,631

Source: Cuban Refugee Program, SRS, DHEW, Fact Sheet, Five Phases of the Program, March 31, 1981.

a. This figure includes 257,447 airlift arrivals (of which 240,634 registered at the Center) and other registrations occurring during the airlift period.

b. Time Magazine, September 1 and 7, 1980.

c. Authors' estimate.

d. Number of refugees registered must be differentiated from the total Cuban population in the U.S. The latter according to the 1980 Census is 794,000. Adding the Mariel refugee would give a total figure of 919,000. Finally, if we took into consideration the probable Census undercount of minorities, it would add another 10% of the grand total.

TABLE 2
MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME

(in constant 1982 dollars)

Year	Hispanic	Black	White	Hispanic family income as of percent white income
1972	$17,790	$14,922	$25,107	71
1973	17,836	14,877	25,777	69
1974	17,594	14,765	24,110	71
1975.	16,140	14,835	24,110	67
1976	16,390	14,766	24,823	66
1977	17,141	14,352	25,124	68
1978	17,518	15,166	25,606	68
1979	18,255	14,590	25,689	71
1980	16,242	13,989	24,176	67
1981	16,401	13,266	23,517	70
1982	16,227	13,598	24,603	66

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Money and Poverty Status and Families and Persons in the United States: 1981" Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 134, July 1982.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MIAMI-CUBAN ECONOMY BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION

PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL of Cuban refugees into Miami in 1959, little data is available as to the extent of the participation of Cuban residents in the local economy. Consequently, it is not possible to assess the contribution made to the local economy by the Cuban community at that time, nor to postulate what economic development might have been had the events of that year not occurred.[1]

However, there is no doubt that the increase in the Cuban community since that time has exerted considerable influence upon the total economy of the area. Some general figures indicate the weight of the Cuban economy in relation to that of Dade County (Miami area) as a whole. One telling figure is the gross income of Hispanics in Dade County, which has been variously estimated at from $6.7 billion (Strategy Research, 1985: 80) to as much as $7.5 billion (Arboleya, 1985: 5). Hispanic income thus accounts for approximately a third of total personal income, by place of residence. These calculations are based upon the figures for median income of Hispanic families (see Table 2) and on the number of Hispanic households in Dade County, which latter has been set at 268,302 (Strategy Research, 1985) or at 254,000 (Arboleya, 1985) according to the method of calculation.

An examination of labor data, occupational distribution, and the educational level of the Cuban population combine to present a picture of past Cuban economic activity and to forecast probable future development. The latter is made possible by the fact that certain areas of economic growth in Dade County are particularly responsive to the qualifications and aptitudes of the Hispanic population. An important area of growth has been the sector concerned with services and trade, with strong contributions being made by transportation, communications, utilities, and the governmental sector as well. This increased sophistication of the local economic base can be traced to the increase in human resource capital and to the development of new markets and contacts abroad (Jorge and Moncarz, 1981b; and the Beacon Council, 1984a: 16). There is reason to conclude that, had the Cuban immigration *not* occurred, the economy might have developed very differently. Let us examine the migration aspect more closely.

First, there is an apparent degree of interdependence in the local Cuban market, especially in the buying and selling of consumer goods as well as in the provision of institutional, professional, and personal services of every kind. This relatively segregated market would not have arisen if Dade County had maintained its previous pattern of growth through internal migration from other parts of the United States (Jorge, 1977: 142).

An important, if not fundamental, step in an in-depth examination of this kind is to measure the nature, extent, and degree of sectoral interrelationship in that market. One could state almost *a priori*, and with considerable truth, that higher coefficients of interdependence will occur at those links in the production chain which are closest to the consumer. This is evident in Dade County, which resembles an "open" economic system in many ways, depending largely on commercial relations with national and foreign markets. It has a very specialized economic structure that, despite its continuing diversification, will always depend heavily on the service sector, both public and private. This open structure makes

Dade County's economy similar (except in income level) to that of underdeveloped areas.

It is likely that the distribution of Cuban and Hispanic-American investment has contributed to the general regional growth, and certainly to the development of the Hispanic market in particular. Cuban economic activity has been oriented toward satisfaction of consumer needs. The reason is clear. Cuban exiles constitute a vertical sample of the population of the Cuban state. The different professions, occupations, skills, all complement one another and help to form a tight interdependent network of goods and services. This interdependence not only preserves the cultural characteristics and identity of the the economic agents, but it also offers mutual support in generating jobs and income among Hispanic peoples. This tendency of the Cubans has only been reinforced by increasing immigration from South, and Central, America as well.

To some extent the development of Dade's Cuban economy has followed a pattern of balanced growth. Different sectors of this economy have developed in a parallel manner, thus bringing about a horizontal integration of the Hispanic market, whereas vertical relationships have been slower to develop because of the "open-ness" of the economy. The latter relationships are generally found in a market economy at a more advanced stage of development.

This Cuban contribution to the Dade economy doubtless reflects the special situation in which the exiles found themselves. They believed themselves to be in a critical, economically insecure position and consequently felt under strong pressure to work and produce. A minority group that finds itself in this situation is far from unprecedented, and the characteristic responses thus called forth are amply documented in studies of economic development and social psychology.

As a result, Cubans in the United States have displayed an attitude toward economic activity atypical of their culture. Vigorous, competitive behavior is the product of an individualized, secularized cultural environment, where empirical values rule absolute in the organization of activities. Changes in attitudes and motivations experienced by Cuban and other Hispanic-American groups during the process of acculturation would suggest a fruitful area for future study.

This perception and response make the Cubans, as well as other Hispanic immigrants in search of better opportunities, a good paradigm of the economic agent in classical economics. The flow of Hispanic-Americans into the Miami area in the 1960s encouraged competition. Through salary competitiveness, resultant lowering of production costs, greater personal effort, and the increment of productivity, this new segment of the population stimulated economic growth in the old pattern described by the classical economists.

This Cuban paradigm deserves special study as it provides an example of growth foreign to the economic models which govern modern consumer societies. The volume of production and income initially increased as a consequence of the primary expansion in the work force. This is an excellent example of Say's Law, in which an increase in supply subsequently produces a corresponding increase in demand.

The expanded Latin sector of Miami's economic life has made itself felt in other ways as well, most noticeably in a heightened cosmopolitanism which serves

to attract and facilitate international activities, a good area for stable, sustained growth. Among the various indicators of areas of future development are: (1) expansion of tourism from the South; (2) establishment of international banks under the protection of the Edge Act; (3) growth in the number of international companies which have seen fit to establish their principal offices for Latin America in the Miami area; (4) increase in the volume/value of international cargo passing through the international airport and the port of Dodge Island; (5) development of Miami as an international center for commerce and light manufactures for export; along with (6) the possibility of serving as financial market for the republics to the South.

As for commerce and tourism, domestic as well as Latin, the arrival and establishment of Cubans and other Hispanic-Americans in the city of Miami and surrounding areas saved Miami from a decline common to other big modern cities. The area commonly known as "Little Havana" provides a particularly good example of private urban renewal.

Hispanic-Americans have also created a differential market. The total market is not highly integrated, due both to the structure of the local economy as well as to the preferences and priorities of Hispanic investors, but this does not mean that the benefits derived reach only members of the Hispanic community. Agricultural, industrial, and transformational enterprises have gradually been expanding and shifting into production of generic goods known to, and used by, Hispanic consumers, or they have been shifting toward specific products that enjoy a special position because of their brand-name associations. The Hispanic markets of the area, including the distribution and sale of consumer goods. It would be inaccurate to assume that these markets function as watertight compartments, completely separated from one another.

Recent data on the evolution of Cuban business in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) of Miami indicates rapid growth in both number and volume of gross receipts of Cuban (Hispanic) firms in the area. The total size of the producers' market, i.e. the value of final output and sales (gross receipts by Cuban and Hispanic-owned firms, can be seen in Table 3, while Table 4 allows us to judge the size of firms in the various sectors based on their average number of employees. Census information cited in Table 5 shows a dramatic 70% increase in Hispanic businesses between 1972 and 1977, whereas during the roughly comparable 1975-1979 period, the number of firms in the entire market grew by only 20% (Dade County Planning Department, 1980: Tables 4-8).[2]

It should also be noted that Cubans in particular, and Hispanics in general, account for a larger share of the consumer market than of the producer market, in the sense that their aggregate income is much larger than that generated only by Cuban or Hispanic-owned firms. This is due to the large number of Cubans employed outside the Latin market, or, as is increasingly the case, those who are self-employed (Strategy Research, 1980: vi; and 1985: 80).

Table 6 shows that the index of median income of the Hispanic population 14-years-old-and-over reached its highest value for Cubans in 1978. By 1982, however, the situation had changed drastically, as Cuban median income fell below that of other Hispanics. Back in 1978, it had been about 20% less than the corresponding figure for the white population; by 1982 it was about 30% less than the

TABLE 3

Spanish Owned Firms

Gross Receipts by Industry

($1,000)

	1969	1972	1977
Construction	$ 8,991	$ 29,324	$ 43,398
Manufacturing	9,899	133,639	188,746
Transportation Public Utilities	19,814	12,467	59,155
Wholesale Trade	11,242	54,061	122,554
Retail Trade	50,715	90,217	148,521
Finance, Insurance Real Estate	5,483	8,904	34,006
Selected Services	10,755	30,912	84,546
Other Industries	818	1,647	3,401
Not Classified	3,248	2,057	3,654
	$120,965	$ 363,228	$687,981

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 and 1977, Surveys of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises, Minority-Owned Business--Spanish Origin, MB-72-2 and MB-77-2.

TABLE 4

Spanish Owned Firms

Average Employees Per Firm
For Those Firms With Paid Employees

	1969	1972	1977
Construction	3.7	10.6	5.0
Manufacturing	10.0	33.6	33.3
Transportation Public Utilities	17.1	6.7	16.4
Wholesale Trade	3.8	6.5	6.4
Retail Trade	3.2	4.7	4.0
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	3.0	6.2	11.2
Selected Services	2.7	5.1	3.7
Other Industries	1.7	4.0	1.5
Not Classified	1.5	2.7	0.2
All Firms	4.2	9.6	8.1

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 and 1977, Surveys of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises, Minority-Owned Business--Spanish Origin, MB-72-2 and MB-77-2.

TABLE 5

Spanish Owned Firms
Number of Firms

	1969	1972	1977
Construction	356	675	1,023
Manufacturing	166	267	295
Transportation			
Public Utilities	230	509	709
Wholesale Trade	167	165	369
Retail Trade	969	1,276	1,727
Finance, Insurance,			
Real Estate	210	267	505
Selected Services	1,016	1,380	3,195
Other Industries	59	107	235
Not Classified	274	201	190
	3,447	4,847	8,248

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 and 1977, Surveys of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises, Minority-Owned Business - Spanish Origin, MB-72-2 and MB-77-2.

TABLE 6

Median Income of persons 14 years old and over by sex, race, and type of Spanish origin: 1978.

(numbers in thousands)

	Males	Females	Males-Females	Males-Females Fifteen Years and Over (1982)*
TOTAL	$10,935	$4,068	$6,867	$8,532
White	11,453	4,117	7,336	
Black	6,861	3,707	3,145	
Hispanic	8,380	3,788	4,592	7,422
Mexican	8,300	3,415	4,885	7,605
Puerto Rican	7,807	4,050	3,757	6,356
Cuban	9,053	4,052	5,001	6,478
Central and South American	8,925	5,086	3,839	7,945
Other Spanish	8,766	4,285	4,481	7,926

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980. Population Profile of the United States: 1979. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 350, p. 44. Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1981. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1979. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 354, p. 31. Washington, D.C.: USGPO:

*U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1985. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1982. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 396, p. 26. Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

TABLE 7

Income in 1981 of All Persons of Spanish Origin 15 Years Old and over, by Type of Spanish origin and Sex: March 1982.

Sex and Income	Total	Mexican	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Central Or South American	Other Spanish
MALE						
Total Persons . . . thousands	4 557	2 834	553	352	472	346
Total with income . . thousands	4 131	2 582	479	329	421	319
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$1 to $1,999 or loss	9.6	10.0	12.5	8.8	4.0	9.5
$2,000 to $2,999	4.2	4.2	3.9	6.6	3.1	3.9
$3,000 to $3,999	5.2	4.9	7.0	7.5	3.7	4.5
$4,000 to $4,999	5.0	4.5	4.6	7.2	6.1	5.6
$5,000 to $5,999	4.8	4.6	4.7	5.6	5.7	4.4
$6,000 to $6,999	4.5	4.3	3.9	6.0	5.4	3.7
$7,000 to $8,499	8.7	8.4	9.7	8.1	12.2	6.2
$8,500 to $9,999	7.1	7.2	7.6	6.0	8.1	5.6
$10,000 to $12,499	12.1	12.4	11.0	10.3	14.1	10.2
$12,500 to $14,999	7.1	7.7	5.6	6.5	5.5	7.3
$15,000 to $17,499	8.3	8.4	9.8	6.2	7.5	7.8
$17,500 to $19,999	4.6	4.5	5.8	2.7	5.4	4.8
$20,000 to $24,999	8.6	8.6	7.3	7.2	9.3	10.2
$25,000 to $29,999	5.0	5.7	3.6	4.2	3.0	4.9
$30,000 to $34,999	2.3	2.2	1.8	2.2	2.7	3.3
$35,000 to $49,999	2.2	1.9	0.9	2.6	2.2	5.9
[illegible]00 to $74,999	0.5	0.3	0.2	1.3	0.9	1.5
[illegible] and over	0.3	0.2	-	1.1	1.0	0.7
[illegible] Income. . . [illegible]rs	10 203	10 397	9 206	8 561	10 293	11 608
[illegible]		12 168	10 808	12 386	13 300	14 515
FEMALE						
Total Persons . . . thousands	4 955	2 917	689	359	538	443
Total with income . . thousands	3 787	2 152	541	310	415	369
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$1 to $1,999 or loss	24.1	26.0	18.9	22.5	23.2	23.0
$2,000 to $2,999	9.2	9.3	10.6	10.2	6.5	8.5
$3,000 to $3,999	9.2	8.2	14.0	13.1	6.6	7.3
$4,000 to $4,999	7.1	7.0	9.4	6.3	5.8	6.7
$5,000 to $5,999	7.5	7.3	8.5	7.3	8.2	7.0
$6,000 to $6,999	6.0	5.6	7.6	5.9	8.6	3.5
$7,000 to $8,499	9.0	8.8	8.7	9.0	8.7	10.6
$8,500 to $9,999	5.5	5.8	4.6	5.5	5.6	5.2
$10,000 to $12,499	8.9	9.0	6.6	9.2	11.7	8.9
$12,500 to $14,999	3.2	3.3	2.3	2.2	3.6	4.6
$17,500 to $19,999	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.5	2.5
$20,000 to $24,999	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.5	1.5	4.9
$25,000 to $29,999	0.7	0.6	0.7	1.2	0.5	1.3
$30,000 to $34,999	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.1
$35,000 to $49,999	0.2	0.1	-	0.3	0.8	0.1
$50.000 to $74,999	-	-	-	0.3	0.2	-
Median Income, Dollars	5 060	4 933	4 698	4 682	5 956	5 629
Mean Income, Dollars	6 389	6 194	6 128	6 345	7 014	7 246

TABLE 7 B

Income in 1981 of All Persons of Spanish Origin 15 Years Old and Over, by Type of Spanish Origin and Sex: March 1982.

SEX AND INCOME	Total Population	SPANISH ORIGIN						Not of Spanish Origin
		Total	Mexican	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Central or South American	Other Spanish	
Both Sexes								
Total Persons, Thousands	176 186	9 512	5 751	1 251	710	1 010	789	166 674
Total with income, Thousands	161 828	7 918	4 734	1 020	640	836	688	153 910
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$1 to $1,999 or loss	15.9	16.5	17.3	15.9	15.4	13.5	16.7	15.9
$2,000 to $2,999	5.8	6.6	6.5	7.4	8.4	4.8	6.4	5.8
$3,000 to $3,999	6.7	7.1	6.4	10.7	10.2	5.1	6.0	6.7
$4,000 to $4,999	5.5	6.0	5.7	7.1	6.7	6.0	6.2	5.5
$5,000 to $5,999	5.1	6.1	5.8	6.7	6.4	6.9	5.8	5.0
$6,000 to $6,999	4.5	5.2	4.9	5.9	5.9	7.0	3.6	4.5
$7,000 to $8,499	6.4	8.8	8.6	9.2	8.5	10.5	8.6	6.3
$8,500 to $9,999	5.2	6.3	6.5	6.0	5.8	6.9	5.4	6.1
$10,000 to $12,499	9.2	10.6	10.9	8.7	9.8	13.0	9.5	9.2
$12,500 to $14,999	6.2	6.0	6.5	4.7	5.0	5.5	6.4	6.2
$15,000 to $17,499	6.1	5.9	6.1	5.8	4.3	5.6	6.1	6.1
$17,500 to $19,999	4.2	3.3	3.2	3.6	2.2	4.0	3.6	4.2
$20,000 to $24,999	7.4	5.6	5.7	4.5	4.4	5.4	7.4	7.5
$25,000 to $29,999	4.6	2.9	3.3	2.1	2.7	1.8	3.0	4.7
$30,000 to $34,999	2.7	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6	2.8
$35,000 to $49,999	3.0	1.2	1.1	0.4	1.5	1.5	2.8	3.1
$50,000 to $74,999	1.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.5	0.7	1.1
$75,000 and over	0.5	0.2	0.1	-	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.5
Median Income, Dollars	8 532	7 422	7 605	6 356	6 478	7 945	7 926	8 630
Mean Income, Dollars	11 909	9 486	9 452	8 328	9 454	10 181	10 619	12 033

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1979 and January 1985. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 354, p. 31 and No. 396, p. 26. Washington, D.C.: USGPO:

TABLE 8

Occupation in Dade County and in Cuba--1966 Miami Sample[a]

Occupational Category	In Cuba	In U.S.
Professionals, Proprietors, Technicians, Managers	48.2%	12.7%
Clerical and Sales	24.3	27.3
Skilled Labor	11.6	17.3
Unskilled Labor	15.9	32.3

a. University of Miami, 1967, p. 62.

corresponding number for the population as a whole. As for median *family* income, the difference between Cubans and the white population was about 15% in 1978, compared to the present (1985) gap of approximately 20%. The gap is explained by the fact that both the size of the Cuban family and its participation rate in the labor force are greater than those of native-born white families. However, 1982 median income of Cuban families ($18,009) was still higher than that of Mexican ($16,933) or Puerto Rican ($11,256) families. Again, size and participation rate work in favor of the Cuban family. The increase in median family income of Dade County Hispanics (80% of whom are Cuban) reflected less progress, from 1969 to 1979, than was true for native-born white, or even black, families. At present, income for black families is only 63% that of white families but is about 77% of that of Hispanic families (USCD-Census, 1985: 9,26; Strategy Research, 1985: 32; and the Beacon Council, 1984a: 17).

In 1981, the median income for the Cuban population 15-year-old-and-over revealed a striking divergence from previous data (see Table 7). Cuban income was $6,478, while Mexican income was $7,605 and Puerto Rican was $6,356. Moreover, Cuban income for males fell below that for Mexican and Puerto Rican males: Cuban - $8,561; Mexican - $10,397; Puerto Rican - $9,206. The following year, 1982, the mean income of Cubans, for both sexes, was $9,454, compared to the Mexican mean income of $9,452 and the Puerto Rican mean income of $8,328, thus confirming our repeated assertion that income distribution for the Cuban population as a whole displays a markedly bi-modal characteristic. This finding also validates data which show the increase in the number of Cubans to be found among individuals and families below the poverty level (USCD-Census, 1982: 26).

Let us now make a few observations on family income of Cubans. According to Strategy Research Corporation, the median family income of the Cuban population was $18,245 in 1980, $18,883 in 1982, and was projected to be $24,400 in 1985 (SRC, 1984: 39). Historically, Cubans appear as having a level of income considerably higher than that of other Hispanic groups in the United states. Carlos Arboleya (1985) has recently reported "the average income of the Cuban head of household (as being) $27,500 per annum;" and he has also noted that there has been a surge in family income in the Latin community in Dade County "which grew from an average of $10,000 in 1975 to $27,500 in 1984" (Arboleya, 1985: 5). On the other hand, Strategy Research gives a lower figure of $23,598 as representing Latin median family income for the same year (SRC, 1985: 32). The Beacon Council, in data of its own, estimated median family income of persons of Spanish origin in Dade County in 1979 at approximately $16,500 (in constant dollars) (Beacon Council, 1984b: 17). If we were to take into account the inflation rate during the intervening 1979-1984 period, the resulting figure in current dollars for the latter year would not differ appreciably from that of Strategy Research.

Further confirmation of the relative accuracy of these latter estimates can be obtained by multiplying the per capita income, for both male and female Cubans 15-years-and-over, in 1982, which was $7,186, by the mean number of persons per Cuban family for that year, which was 3.35, to arrive at a figure of $24,073 (USDC-Census, 1985: 7 and 26). On the other hand, the same Census report declares, on pp. 9-10, that the 1982 median Family income for Cubans was $18,009. Even allowing for real growth and inflation during the 1982-85 period, the adjusted figure would be around $21,500. The apparent discrepancy between these figures and the preceding ones may result from the median income for Cubans being lower than the mean income

because of the bi-modal income distribution pattern, already mentioned, which characterizes the Cuban population. This latter factor may also contribute to the increase in number of Dade county families who live below the poverty level. While this figure has been declining for the state of Florida and for the United States as a whole, it has been increasing in Dade County (Miami).

Finally, we could add to the list of specific contributions made to the local economy as a result of the Cuban migration to Miami the input of funds from the federal government to support the refugee program and to help the local school system accommodate and absorb those Cuban refugees of school age. Various studies have repeatedly demonstrated that these cultural-impact and educational funds in reality subsidized the local school system. Excluding the initial period of Cuban influx into Miami, school taxes were sufficient to cover the expense of absorbing Cuban children into the school system; the same reasoning may be applied to the federal funds allotted to help the refugees (Jorge, 1977: 146).

ARRIVAL OF CUBAN EXILES IN MIAMI

INITIALLY, MOST CUBANS MIGRATING to the United States did not look upon themselves as refugees but, rather, as temporary exiles from a homeland only 90 miles from the Florida coast. For this reason, the majority chose to remain in Miami, geographically close and similar in environment to Cuba, and where they could live with, or near, friends and relatives. Being together, they could offer support to one another and keep alive the hope of an early return to their island.

The entry of so many Cubans into the local labor market temporarily increased the overall real unemployment coefficient and possibly reduced the minimum wage rate in certain sectors. Frequently, even those Cubans fortunate enough to find work were unable to put their skills and experience to work. Lack of knowledge of available job opportunities, and the perception that their stay in the United States was only temporary, mitigated against their efforts and ability to find appropriate employment. The desire to remain in Miami was so strong that even professionals preferred to take menial jobs which permitted them to remain in the area, rather than to seek employment commensurate with their qualifications in other parts of the United States (Moncarz, 1969: 22).

Up til the end of 1960, the Cuban government placed few restrictions on Cubans leaving the island. After that time, however, the Cuban government began to confiscate all real and personal property of persons planning to leave, or flee, the country. This meant that many Cubans arrived with little or no means of support, thereby constituting a financial drain on Miami's social service and charitable organizations and agencies (Thomas, 1967: 47).

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

SINCE STUDIES OF OCCUPATIONAL mobility among Cubans began to be undertaken from the very beginning of their arrival into Miami, considerable data is available to trace the course of this aspect of their adaptation.

In July 1966, the University of Miami conducted a survey of Cubans in Dade County in an effort to draw some comparisons between current occupations in

Miami and former occupations in which they had been engaged in Cuba. Results are shown in Table 8 and reveal a true loss in occupational status. The percentage of unskilled laborers had doubled, from 15.9% in Cuba to 32.3% in Dade County, while the percentage of professionals, proprietors, technicians and managers had suffered a four-to-one reduction: from 48.2% in Cuba to 12.7% in the United States (UM-CAIS, 1967: 62).

The 1970 Census gives data on Spanish-speaking persons in the Miami area (overwhelming majority of whom were Cuban), which can be used to give some indication of the breakdown in occupational categories for Cubans in Miami for that year (USCD-Census, 1972b: table on p. 8), and which will allow us to make a rough comparison with the data obtained by the University of Miami in 1966.

As indicated by Table 9, if the Census categories are combined to make them comparable to the 1966 survey, there seems to have no upward occupational mobility among Cubans in Miami between 1966 and 1970, nor by 1974 (data by Raul Moncarz).

Table 10 reveals some very interesting data published by the US Department of Commerce, for the years of 1975, 1976, 1978, and 1980, on the employment status, and major occupations, of Cuban males 16-years-and-over. Comparing the figures for 1970 with 1976, one can see that the employment status of Cuban males remained relatively the same. From 1976 to 1978, however, the total number of Cuban males in the labor force increased by 15,000, while the number of professional, technical, and kindred workers among them rose from 13.8% (27,324). Clearly, this computation lacks credibility.

If the 1980 figures are regarded as accurate, the Cuban community in the United States is bi-polar, with 22% of the community made up of two occupational groups: (1) professional, technical, and kindred workers, and (2) managers and administrators; whereas over 45% of the community is comprised of operatives, laborers, and service workers. This unique characteristic suggests that while a number of Cubans have been able to maintain or recapture their high employment status, an even larger number continue to work in occupations below their capabilities and previous status.

If the Census figures for the years from 1976 through 1979 are combined in order to compare them with our previous information (see Table 11), there has been no significant upward mobility in occupation, by Cubans in the United States, at the group level, since 1959.

This conclusion is further confirmed by US Department study giving occupational figures for Cuban males as of March 1982 (see Table 10), which shows that the percentage of Cuban males employed as professionals, technical and kindred workers at that date was 15.1%, while those employed as managers and administrators were about 8.8% of the population (USCD-Census, 1985). This holds true for Cuban professionals in Florida and, most particularly, in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of Miami, where most of these professionals reside.

Table 9

Cuban Occupations in Miami: 1966 & 1970, 1974, 1980

Occupation	1980[g]	1974 (RM)[e]	Miami SMSA 1970 Census[a]	1966 Dade County[d]	White Population Miami SMSA[f]
Technical Managers & Professionals	17.8%	13.5%	14.1%	12.7%	27.5%
Clerical & Sales	28.3	24.6	23.8	27.3	28.8
Skilled Labor	36.9	17.3	14.5[b] 3.5[c]	17.3	26.2
Unskilled Labor	16.3	44.6	43.8	32.3	16.2

a. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Tracts, Final Report PH(1) - 129. Table p-8.
b. Craftsmen, Foreman and Kindred Workers
c. Transport Operatives
d. University of Miami, 1967
e. Pilot Study by Raul Moncarz
f. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1981. Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 1980. Washington: USGPO
g. Ibid.

TABLE 10

Employment Status and Major Occupation Group of Cuban Males 16 Years Old and Over in the United States

Employment Status and Occupation	1979 (Total Population)	1970	1975	1976	1978	1979	1982
Persons 16 years old and over				237M	259M	300M	346M
Persons in Civilian Labor Force		141M	191M	183M	198M	250M	253M
Percent Unemployed			15.1%	12.0%	8.6%	9.5%	9%
Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers	14.7%	12.9%	12.2%	13.4%	17.0%	13.6%	15.1%
Managers and Administrators, Exc. Farmers	14.0%	7.4%	9.1%	5.1%	13.8%	8.6%	8.8%
Sales Workers	5.9%	5.5%	3.5%	5.3%	3.4%	6.7%	7.5%
Clerical Kindred Workers	6.2%	10.7%	12.5%	10.3%	5.6%	6.3%	8.6%
Craft and Kindred Workers	21.1%	18.0%	17.5%	18.0%	16.4%	23.4%	20.6%
Operatives, Inc. Transportation	17.7%	24.2%	24.3%	21.6%	20.3%	22.9%	20 %
Laborers, Excluding Farmers	7.6%	6.1%	2.2%	7.6%	8.6%	6.6%	7.7%
Service Workers	8.7%	14.3%	18.6%	18.6%	14.4%	11.0%	11.6%

M = 1.000

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: Population Characteristics, Series p-20, nos. 354 and 396. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1979, October 1980, p. 29, and January 1985, p. 24.

TABLE 11

Cuban Occupations
In Cuba vs. The United States

Occupational Category	In Cuba	In U.S. 1976	1970	1975	1976	1978	1979	1982
Professionals, Proprietors, Technicians and Managers	48.2%	12.7%	20.3%	21.3%	18.5%	30.8%	22.2%	23.9%
Clerical and Sales	24.3	27.3	16.2	16.0	15.6	9.0	13.0	16.1
Skilled Labor	11.6	17.3	18.0	17.5	18.0	16.4	23.4	20.6
Unskilled Labor	15.9	32.3	45.0	45.1	47.8	43.3	41.4	39.3

Sources: Same as those of Tables 8, 9, and 10.

DISCRIMINATION AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN CAPITAL

Discrimination

According to Andrew Greeley, US Catholics suffer from what Michael Hechter describes, in his book *Internal Colonialism*, as discrimination via the "cultural division of labor," a system of stratification in which one or more groups is systematically excluded from certain key positions in society. It should be added, parenthetically, that most Catholics in the United States seem to be unaware of this situation until, paradoxically, success puts an end to their ignorance (Greeley, 1977). Interestingly, Juan Clark's studies of Miami Cubans confirms Greeley's observation (Clark, 1985).

At this point it is useful to note that the experience of South Florida Cuban community both confirms and contradicts the truth of Greeley's finding. Many Cubans, like the Catholics Greeley studied, readily and willingly recognize their ethnicity but do not perceive themselves as members of a disadvantaged minority (Jorge and Moncarz, 1981a). The contradiction comes from the fact that the non-Hispanic Catholics researched by Greeley are definitely not economically disadvantaged relative to the non-black members of other religious denominations (Greeley, 1977: chapters 1,3 and 13). In contrast, Cubans may now be slipping from the relatively comfortable economic position they enjoy vis-a-vis the other Hispanic nationalities because the new arrivals are more systematically excluded. *A fortiori*, this would be equivalent to an increase in the relative size of the gap between the income of Cubans and that of the rest of the US (particularly the white) population.

The Cuban National Planning Council has recently released a study which prompts questions as to the direction and strength of economic trends currently at work in the Cuban community (Díaz, 1980: chapters III and IV). One question is: what will be the economic effect of changes now taking place in the composition of the Cuban population? Such changes include the increasing influence of the Cuban-American segment of the population as well as the addition of a new group of very young exiles. We do not know whether "young" Cubans are falling behind other groups as income earners when compared to (a) the US population as a whole or to (b) other Hispanic groups.

The authors would like to suggest that this aspect be studied in depth. For example, a comparative demographic profile of the Cuban population could be projected to indicate both the percentage, and absolute numbers, of Cubans in successive age brackets, correlated (where appropriate) to schooling (both academic and vocational), training, skills, experience, occupation, and income. The purpose would be to establish an earnings function by age category. Two kinds of information could be obtained in this way. *First*, it would be possible to determine income earnings of "young" Cubans relative to Cuban income earners as a whole. The category of "young" would have to be defined, presumably those who were not income earners at some declared initial base period, such as 1959-1965. *Second*, once this data became available, it might be possible to determine whether Cubans experience discrimination as a group. Although the employment structure in various labor markets of "young" and "old" Cubans may accurately reflect the degree of discrimination that exists in those markets, presumably the occupational distribution could have been different. It would be necessary to analyze such

markets closely in order to obtain meaningful, useful data.

The concern here is with the need to preserve the Cuban social product in the South Florida area, particularly with the need to prevent any loss of ground due either to discrimination or to a failure to retain, if not to enhance, its resource of human capital. Physical and financial capital cannot substitute for non-capital factor earnings in competitive markets. Not only does non-earned factor income amount to only 20-25% of the national product in advanced societies, but, furthermore, the very fact of the Cubans' recent arrival means that there has not yet been time for group members to accumulate physical capital comparable to that owned by the native white population.

Education

The educational level of Cubans, though somewhat lower than that of the native white population, is higher than that of other Hispanic groups in the United States. Present trends indicate that Cubans will continue to enjoy this advantage relative to other Hispanic groups at least until the end of this century.[3]

However, a factor of enormous importance to the future of the South Florida area, and to the Hispanic community in particular, is the increasing rate at which Hispanic youth have been dropping out of school. The National Commission on Secondary Schooling for Hispanics has revealed that "(nationally) a little over 19% of the Cuban-American students drop out of high school. In Dade (County) the Hispanic dropout rate from public school was 17.9% in 1983-84" (Miami News, 1984: 1A and 4A). No Mariel refugees were included in the survey.

A couple of years ago, the Chairman of the Dade County School Board, Paul Cejas, estimated the student dropout rate at the time to be about 30% (Diario Las Americas, 1984), a figure which would translate into 31% for Hispanic students according to calculations by the authors. These figures correspond closely to those revealed by a previous study for the 1978-79 school year in which dropout rate for Hispanic students was estimated at 18.4%, very similar to that for white students (Jorge and Moncarz, 1980: 76-82). In 1983, the Dade County School Board was quoting a dropout rate of 32.5% for Hispanics compared to a (lower) figure of 25.5% for white students. Obviously the rate at which Hispanic students drop out of school has increased ominously. It is not clear to what extent the arrival of a new group of student refugees, deriving from the Mariel boatlift of 1980, have contributed to this situation, in the sense of bringing with them problems of both language and adjustment which might be reflected in the figures. Probable causes, including endogenous factors, influencing Hispanic dropout rates have been thoroughly explored by the authors in a previous study (Jorge and Moncarz, 1980: Section II, 78-80).[7]

Last of all, it is wise to recognize that the production function in the South Florida area is very delicately balanced on a structural arrangement of ethnic/cultural cooperation. Any major change in this arrangement might well carry large economic costs. The moral to be derived from this observation is that social cooperation remains the key to a continuation of present prosperity.

THE MARIEL REFUGEES

IN APRIL 1980 A SECOND wave of Cuban refugees began to sweep toward the United States, creating a tide which was not to ebb until September of the same year, by which time some 125,000 had entered the US via Key West, Florida.

This second wave of migration had been sparked by the occasion of a mass occupation of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana by an estimated 11,000 Cubans who sought asylum there, embarrassing the Cuban government in the process. The Castro government dealt with this challenge by opening its port of Mariel to all those of its citizens who wished to depart, together with a number of those whom the government wanted to depart as well. The operation was both chaotic and disorderly and took the US government totally by surprise.

To cope with this unexpected influx of refugees, the US government established four so-called "processing centers" to group, screen and, eventually, relocate those refugees who had neither family members nor sponsors in the United States. Within this category fell a large number of unaccompanied minors, the mentally and chronically ill, and the elderly. Close to half (60,242) of the entrants were sent to these centers, of whom only about a third (20,000) proved difficult to resettle permanently. Altogether, almost 123,000 were absorbed by local communities, of which Miami accounted for the lion's share (90,000). A few hundred were sent to federal mental health institutions, and the remaining refugees (who amounted to less than 2% of the total, or 2,500) were imprisoned in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.

Because of the haste and confusion which surrounded the whole phenomenon of the Mariel boatlift, a multitude of myths and distortions has arisen about the characteristics of the migrants themselves as well as of their impact, economic and otherwise, upon their host communities. It is our purpose here to correct some of the distortions on the one hand, and to examine the impact (particularly the economic impact) they may have exerted on the other. Perhaps because it is still rather recent history, the Mariel boatlift has not been a popular subject for research by scholars. Lacking are the kind of carefully documented analyses of events and social forces which precipitate such migratory explosions, nor of their repercussions for the host society, which are needed for a greater understanding of these population movements. In this respect, the observations made here owe much to the work of Dr. Juan Clark (1985).

Characteristics

It comes as a surprise to many to learn that, contrary to the popular image, the level of formal education of the Mariel refugees, as a group, is on a par with that of Cuban refugees who arrived during the 1970s (Bach, 1980: 45). It also comes as a surprise to learn that the much-publicized high rate of criminality supposedly rampant in the Mariel population is not supported by the available evidence.[5] The Miami-Dade Criminal Justice Council has reported that:

> Only an insignificant number of the 12,000 refugees aged 10-18 years have been adjudicated as delinquents in Juvenile Court. Further, the Florida Department of

> Corrections reported that 42 Mariel refugees were in the state adult prison system at the end of 1981--a figure so low as to be statistically insignificant. The largest number of Mariel refugees were incarcerated in the September-November 1980 period, which, by the way, coincides with the highest peak of Dade County criminal activity. In 1981 their numbers at the bond hearings began to decrease and, comparing the 1980 high period with the same period this year, there are 23% (fewer) Mariel refugees seeking a bond release. While Latins today constitute over 40% of the Dade County population, they commit only 20-25% of all adult crime and only 15-20% of juvenile crime (Fabricio, 1982).

Another misconception involves the racial composition of the Mariel population, among whom there is reputed to be a disproportionate number of *mestizos* (persons of mixed race). In reality this cohort is simply more representative of the Cuban population as a whole than were earlier immigrants. Mariel migrants may closely resemble the racial stratification of the Cuban population as registered in the 1953 census.

Economic impact

By extrapolating correlated historical data, and adjusting it for ongoing structural economic changes, the authors were able to create an income and employment model for South Florida which they used to arrive at the following conclusions. *First*, if the local South Florida economy wee to grow for 2-3 years at the same average annual rate of the previous two decades, the local labor force would be able to absorb the Mariel immigrants completely. *Second*, these new entrants may have brought with them sufficient training, skills, and experience as to stimulate the growth rate of the local economy beyond previous expectations.[6] This would then replicate the role played by earlier groups of refugees.

In sum, the close match between supply and demand for labor is clearly related to growth rate performance. Concentration of Cuban labor in the craft and machine-operation categories has closely dovetailed with structural needs of the local economy in the past and probably will continue to do so. Furthermore, Cuban willingness to accept wages below the prevailing market rate, even if only in the short-term, will continue to serve as a supply-side stimulus to the economy. This factor is particularly useful in breaking up a stationary state or an under-employment equilibrium. By stimulating output directly and thus inducing increased supply from the private sector, Cuban wage flexibility insures more effective cumulative growth than does one-shot, or transient, fiscal devices designed to stimulate the economy by increasing demand.

One other characteristic which distinguishes the economic behavior of the Mariel refugees should be noted. A large number of refugees, on their own, have taken to the streets as peddlers and vendors of a most diverse array of wares. Many others offer their skills door-to-door as itinerant repairmen or have undertaken small businesses. As a group, the Mariel refugees display strong personal initiative and willingness to assume responsibility for their future.[7] In short, they have

exhibited an ability to adapt to a competitive, individualistic market pattern in remarkably rapid fashion.

In the opinion of the authors, the Mariel population will blend into the local society and economy within a relatively short period of time and without need for major adjustment. They are already doing so. Their economic behavior simply confirms the opinion expressed by a perceptive journalist to the effect that "Adam Smith is alive and well in Miami" (Godsell, 1980: 11).

CUBANS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

CUBANS WERE SLOW TO BECOME politically active in Dade County. In the early years (after 1959) this was clearly a reflection of the prevailing perception that the Castro regime would be only temporary and that they would be able to return to their island home. With the passage of time and the consolidation of a communist government in Cuba, the notion of return receded farther and farther into the future.

Initially, Cubans did not perceive themselves to be disadvantaged by their detachment from political participation. There is an unusually high concentration of Cuban exiles in the Miami area and the very weight of this population density contributed to their influence within the community at large as well as to their sense of ethnic identity and cohesion as well. In addition the Cuban community was concentrated upon maintaining itself economically, a challenge which was met successfully on the whole, due to the combination of training and skills which they had brought with them from Cuba, the familiarity of many of the characteristics of the Dade County area, their own positive attitudes towards work and effort, among others. Preoccupied with the concern of "making it" economically and hopes for an early return to their homeland, local politics held little appeal. For these reasons, a sizable movement towards naturalization did not occur during the 1960s.

At the same time, interest in national politics was another matter. The Cuban community was always interested in influencing US foreign policy towards Cuba, an issue which they believed had nothing to do with politics at the state or local level. It was only gradually that the perception grew that participation at the city, county, and state levels could translate into reinforcing their influence in Washington, at the national level, as well.

As Cubans gradually recognized the benefits to be derived from political participation at all levels, they could no longer remain indifferent to the political advantages to be gleaned from their own considerable numbers in the Miami area. In that light, the prediction that Cubans would become more politically active by the middle of the 1970s was no more than a self-evident prophecy (Salter and Mings, 1972: 123-131).

With this realization, the number of Cuban residents opting for citizenship rapidly increased. More than 40% of the total Cuban population may now be naturalized citizens.[8] As Cubans became citizens, they also became registered voters (see Table 12). While the number of Cubans registered to vote grew rapidly during the 1970s, the rate of increase appears to have dropped more recently in the 1981-83 period (see Table 12). Nonetheless, Hispanic voters constitute a growing share of all

TABLE 12

Percentage of Registered Hispanic Voters
of All Voters in Dade County

1973	6%
1975	9
1977	13
1979	16
1981	19
1983	21

Percentage of Registered Cuban Voters
of All Voters in Dade County

1973	6%
1975	7
1977	10
1979	13
1981	15
1983	17

Source: Personal interview, Metropolitan Dade County Department of Elections.

TABLE 13

Hispanic Political Party Affiliation in Dade County

	Republican	Democratic	All Other
1975	25,880	28,428	5,105
1977	36,637	44,436	10,222
1979	44,431	56,213	13,338
1981	56,415	55,830	14,424
1983	65,320	51,909	13,479

registered voters in the area, due both to the continuous growth of the Hispanic population as well as to an absolute decline among white voters.

Because for so much of this time the Cuban community in Miami has been largely concerned with the single issue of anti-communism and/or anti-Castroism, and because it has assumed a Republican administration would be more likely to share its views than a Democratic administration, Cuban politics are widely perceived as conservative within the United States. However, prior to the Castro regime coming to power in Cuba, conservatism was by no means the hallmark of Cuban domestic politics. In fact, the platform of all Cuban political parties had been markedly progressive following the Revolution of 1933. Neither was there any significant correlation, in pre-Castro Cuba, between party registration and socio-economic levels. Consequently, Cuban political party preferences in the United States are almost exclusively based upon the assumption that the Republican Party and its candidates are more anti-Castro than their Democratic counterparts. In order to illustrate the changes in perception on this question by Cuban voters, let us look at Table 13. It is apparent that Republican party affiliation increased after the election of President Reagan on the Republican ticket. This would clearly support the authors' previous (and long-held) conclusion that Cuban political sympathies are primarily influenced by foreign policy considerations, especially those involving Cuba and anti-communism (ideology). The personality, personal ideological convictions, and political position of President Reagan have served to verify these assumptions.

At the state and local levels the change in political attitudes is also evident. In the past few years, Cubans have run successfully for seats in the Florida House of Representatives and even in the US Congress. In the cities of Dade County, Cubans have fared even better. The cities of Miami, Hialeah, and Sweetwater have all elected Cuban mayors, among other elected officials, illustrating a trend toward more active Cuban presence and participation in local politics. Moreover, the movement for reapportionment and single-member districts will only enhance the opportunities for Cubans and favor their election in districts where Cuban predominance is clear.

There is every indication that Cuban political power will increase throughout the 1980s and beyond. In 1982, a Cuban-born major was elected in Hialeah, the second most populous city in Dade County. There are 107,000 Latins residing in Hialeah, an overwhelming majority of the city's total population of 194,000. In 1981, the Cuban-American mayor of Sweetwater, a small Dade County municipality, was appointed by the Governor of Florida to fill a vacant seat on the Board of (Dade) County Commissioners. He has since been elected Commissioner in his own right. In the City of Miami, with a (1984) population of 216,000 Latins out of a total of 383,000 inhabitants, the mayor as well as two of the commissioners are Latin.

As has happened with immigrant groups in the past, Cuban participation in the political system will expand along with their knowledge and political sophistication. It is safe to predict that Cubans will enjoy their comfortable political majority in many South Florida cities for many years to come and at least a minority representation at the county government level for the next few years at least. Cuban representation at the state level will likely increase as well.

CONCLUSIONS

THIS STUDY HAS ATTEMPTED TO bring together some relevant data to present an overview of the experience of the Cuban community in South Florida, from its inception as a reaction to the Cuban Revolution of 1959 through its gradual accommodation to the reality of permanent exile and an altered view of its own future.

The authors' studies show that Cubans in Dade County (Florida) are exceptional in many respects. However, the picture is one of both strengths and weaknesses. Cuban income and formal education are, on the whole, above the average for Hispanic groups and blacks, although this advantage appears to be gradually eroding. On the other hand, the average age of the Cuban population is considerably above the median for other Hispanic groups, which may represent a handicap over the long run.

A profile of this type conceals as much as it reveals. For instance, there is a whole range of areas of the Cuban experience which are conspicuous by their absence, either because they have never been the subject of study or because those studies attempted have been incomplete or superficial in their findings. Let us enumerate a few of these areas.

1. *Education.* The dropout rate among Cuban high school students has been mentioned and deplored. However, figures are scanty and irregular. This is a situation which needs to be monitored on a regular basis and subjected to continuing analysis to discern trends in student values and behavior patterns as well as absolute numbers. Education is an important factor in the development of human capital, and any decline in the level of education may contribute to downward mobility for the community as a whole.[9] An area for study that remains totally unexplored is the incidence of Cubans in higher education, both as students (numbers as well as areas of concentration) and as faculty and administrators in local institutions.[10]

2. *Economic behavior.* The Cuban community is widely perceived as having achieved a degree of economic success unique for an incoming immigrant group.[11] However, little is known about the attitudes, value systems, and circumstances responsible for this success, which is by no means evenly distributed throughout the Cuban population. What factors made for success among some, but not for others? What, if any, changes in values have taken place as a result of the immigrant experience?

Since the entry of the Cuban population into Miami, the local economy acquired a strong international dimension, in both trade and banking, which had previously been relatively underdeveloped. The Cubans were major participants in this process. Is the Cuban contribution measurable? What resources did they bring, and to what degree, to enable this development to take place? An understanding of this process can facilitate predictions about the future of this development as well.[12]

3. *Social problems.* The much-vaunted Cuban economic success serves to cast a shadow of oblivion over the situation of the less fortunate members of the community: the poverty of the old and infirm, the widow and the orphan, the

unskilled and the non-functional in the English language. Little is known of this group in terms of their numbers, their problems, their strategies for survival. Overlapping are the mental health problems of both young and old, which are often inextricably entwined with the larger issue of acculturation, how well or how poorly the individual has managed to adapt to, or integrate, a whole new set of cultural values. While some studies have touched upon this, too little is known of the acculturation process in the specific environment of Dade County, which differs considerably from Cuban enclaves in other parts of the United States.[13]

4. *Politics.* Some hard data on numbers of Cuban voters and their party affiliations is known and discussed in the text, but analysis of present voting behavior, with an eye to predicting future behavior, is scant. What is the propensity for bloc voting in the future?[14] What domestic issues, now subordinated to foreign policy considerations, are likely to assume importance in the future? Do young Cuban-American voters display priorities that differ from their elders?

5. *Discrimination.* The sensitive subject of discrimination is another issue that demands objective investigation. The term is applied to a variety of formal and informal arrangements, attitudes, behavior patterns, and decision-making mechanisms which are characterized by unequal treatment or denial of equal opportunity to the Hispanic (Cuban) applicant for a given position in either the public or private sector. There is a widespread perception in the Cuban community that such discriminatory practices are prevalent in the local society.[15]

Since discrimination runs counter to the social values of the community, the extent and nature of such practices needs to be determined empirically, and instances verified, so that proper measures can be taken to counteract this socially injurious behavior.

Lacking the kind of studies suggested above, the profile of the Cuban community in South Florida must remain incomplete at best.

For the future, we can speak of opportunities and dangers, of frontiers unexploited and of latent disadvantages. Nevertheless, unless Cubans come to recognize the strong link between education and vocational training on the one hand with level of income on the other, they will find themselves relinquishing the position of relative advantage they now hold vis-a-vis other Hispanic groups. Similarly, unless Cubans find a way to gain access to capital financing on a scale, and terms, competitive with the native white population, their hold on productive wealth will weaken also (Jorge and Moncarz, 1980: 68-669). Cubans have exhibited great capacity for adaptation but there is no room for complacency.

APPENDIX

TABLE A

Distribution of Spanish origin groups among six states containing the largest number of each group: 1976.

Mexican			Puerto Rican			Cuban			C. and S. American			Other Spanish		
State	Number	Percent	State	Number	Percent	State	Number	Percent	State	Number	Percent	State	Number	Percent
TOTAL	6,827	100.00	TOTAL	1,567	100.0	TOTAL	672	100.0	TOTAL	784	100.0	TOTAL	1,231	100.0
Cal.	2,745	40.2	N.Y.	849	54.2	Fla.	415	61.8	N.Y.	288	36.7	Cal.	268	21.8
Texas	2,480	36.3	N.J.	181	11.5	N.J.	92	13.7	Cal.	234	29.8	N.M.	202	16.4
Ariz.	319	4.7	Ill.	131	8.4	N.Y.	72	10.7	Fla.	60	7.7	N.Y.	201	16.3
Ill.	222	3.3	Cal.	100	6.4	Cal.	33	4.9	N.J.	58	7.4	Fla.	127	10.3
N.M.	214	3.1	Penn.	100	6.4	Other	60	8.9	Ill.	25	3.2	Colo.	58	4.7
Colo.	211	9.3	Conn.	58	3.7				Mass.	21	2.7	Texas	51	4.1
Other	636	9.3	Other	148	9.4				Other	98	12.5	Other	324	26.3

Source: 1976 Survey of Income and Education.

Cuban: 1980

State	Number	Percent
TOTAL	771	100.0
Fla.	469	61.0
N.J.	84	11.0
N.Y.	79	10.0
Cal.	64	8.0
Other		10.0

Source: 1980 Census, General Population Characterstics.

TABLE B

Metropolitan- Nonmetropolitan Residence of All Families and Spanish Origin Families, by Type of Spanish Origin: March 1980.
(numbers in thousands)

Area	Total	Mexican	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Other Spanish
Number					
United States	3,100	1,785	461	243	611
Metropolitan areas	2,587	1,414	435	235	502
In central cities	1,495	775	344	96	281
Outside central cities	1,092	640	91	139	221
Nonmetropolitan areas	512	370	25	8	109
Percent Distribution					
United States	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Metropolitan areas	83.5	79.3	94.5	96.7	82.2
In central cities	48.2	43.4	74.7	39.5	46.0
Outside central cities	35.2	35.8	19.8	57.2	36.2
Nonmetropolitan areas	16.5	20.7	5.5	3.3	17.8
% of metropolitan are residents in suburbs	42.2	45.1	21.0	54.2	44.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1981. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1980 (Advance Report). Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 361, p. 5 Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

Residence of Cuban Families

Percent Distribution	
United States	100.0
Metropolitan Areas	97.5
In central cities	40.7
Outside central cities	56.8
Nonmetropolitan areas	2.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1982. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 396, P. 7. Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

TABLE C

Spanish origin persons 14 years old and over by income intervals in 1978, sex, and nationality of Spanish origin.
(numbers in thousands)

Sex/Income	Total Spanish Origin	Mexican Origin	Puerto Rican Origin	Cuban Origin	Central or South American	Other Spanish
Male						
Total w/ income	3,447	2,148	388	286	232	393
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$1-$1,999 or loss	11.7	232.	13.6	11.4	8.0	12.7
$2,000-$3,999	12.1	12.0	13.5	11.7	8.1	14.0
$4,000-$5,999	10.0	11.5	11.4	7.0	12.8	8.3
$6,000-$9,999	24.3	24.1	25.5	25.4	26.5	21.8
$10,000-$14,000	20.5	20.4	18.4	24.4	24.2	17.5
$15,000-$24,999	16.8	16.8	16.5	16.4	15.8	18.2
$25,000 and over	3.8	3.6	1.3	3.6	4.6	7.3
Median Income	$8,380	$8,300	$7,807	$9,503	$8,925	$8,766
Mean Income	$9,777	$9,608	$8,654	$10,217	$10,409	$11,115
Female						
Total w/ income	2,949	1,640	428	254	240	388
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
$1-$1,999 or loss	28.0	32.4	17.8	26.6	17.2	28.4
$2,000-$3,999	24.2	23.6	31.5	23.0	23.5	19.9
$4,000-$5,999	17.4	17.2	22.6	18.1	17.3	11.7
$6,000-$9,999	18.6	16.2	18.4	21.4	25.9	22.5
$10,000-$14,999	8.8	7.8	7.3	8.5	12.3	12.4
$15,000-$24,999	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.1	3.7	4.3
$25,000 and over	0.3	0.3	—	0.3	0.4	0.8
Median Income	$3,788	$3,415	$4,050	$4,052	$5,086	$4,285
Mean Income	$4,798	$4,449	$4,887	$4,882	$5,725	$5,550

TABLE D

Spanish Owned Firms

% of Total Receipts by Industry

	1969	1972	1977
Construction	7.43%	8.07%	6.31%
Manufacturing	8.18	36.79	27.44
Transportation Public Utilities	16.38	3.43	8.60
Wholesale Trade	9.29	14.88	17.82
Retail Trade	41.93	24.84	21.59
Finance, Insurance Real Estate	4.53	2.45	4.91
Selected Services	8.89	8.51	12.29
Other Industries	.68	.45	0.05
Not Classified	2.68	.57	0.05
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Note: Percentages may not total to 100 due to roundings.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 and 1977, Surveys of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises, Minority-Owned Business--Spanish Origin, MB-72-2 and MB-77-2.

TABLE E

Spanish Owned Firms

Gross Receipts Per Unit

	1969	1972	1977
Construction	$ 25,256	$ 43,443	$ 42,422
Manufacturing	59,633	500,520	639,817
Transportation Public Utilities	86,147	24,493	83,434
Wholesale Trade	67,317	327,642	332,124 *
Retail Trade	52,338	70,703	85,999 *
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	26,110	33,348	63,338
Selected Services	10,586	22,400	26,462 *
Other Industries	13,864	15,393	14,472
Not Classified	11,854	10,234	19,232
	$ 35,093	$ 74,939	$ 83,412

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972 and 1977, Surveys of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises, Minority-Owned Business--Spanish Origin, MB-72-2 and MB-77-2.

ENDNOTES

1. On this point see Jorge (1977: 41). See Tables 2 and 3 for the distribution of the Hispanic population by states of highest concentration and by distribution between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.

2. Unfortunately, 1980 Census data on minority-owned business was not available as of publication of this study (July 1985). Sergio Diaz Briquets (1984) cites, in Bureau of the Census 1977 data for minority-owned business, that there were 30,336 Cuban-owned firms in the United States. He deduces from this figure that 7,336 of these businesses are located in Miami. The authors have serious reservations abut the data and its interpretation. Carlos Arboleya, on the other hand, cites a radically different figure of 19,700 Cuban-owned businesses in Miami (Arboleya, 1985).

3. For data on this area, as well as regarding other aspects of the Cuban population, see Jaffe, Cullen and Boswell (1980: 30-32 and 35-38).

4. Recent data on the apparently increasing dropout rate among Hispanics in the Dade County public school system includes the large number of Hispanic students failing the Florida Functional Literacy Test as reported in the *Miami Herald* (1978a, 1978b, 1980b, 1981g) and the insufficient Hispanic employment in the public sector, also reported in the *Miami Herald* (1978d, 1980a, 1981m) as well as in the *Miami News* (1984: 1A and 4A) and in *Diario Las Americas* (1984). The latter data concerning public sector employment merits further investigation to determine any trends.

5. It should be mentioned that, despite repeated public assertions attributing major responsibility for Miami's increasing crime rate to the influx of Mariel immigrants, local law enforcement agencies have not gathered the data to support such allegations (see Bach, Bach, and Triplett, 1981: Table 7; and Time Magazine, 1981a and 1981b). The New York Times (1985) reported opposing statements by police and public functionaries who have called attention to increased rates of criminal incidence by Mariel refugees in their own localities.

6. See Portes, Clark, and Lopez (1981-82) who, as part of the project *Latin American Immigrant Minorities in the US*, report the successful absorption of a sample of Cuban refugees who arrived in the US in 1973-74, were originally interviewed in 1976, and then again in 1979-80. Table 5 gives an overview of the occupational history of the population interviewed.

7. There is some very interesting literature on the strong entrepreneurial efforts made by different immigrant groups in the United States, in a less-than-favorable environment. Among titles well-known in the field are THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY, by Edna Bonacich and John Modell (1980: Chapters 3, 4, 10, and 15) and ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA by Ivan H. Light (1972).

8. The number of Latin and white voters in the City of Miami was about the same for each group in 1981, namely 40,000. County-wide, there are about 130,000 Latin voters out of a total of more than 700,000-plus voters (Miami Herald, 1981j).

9. We have already alluded to the possibility that the dropout rate among Hispanics is higher than that revealed by official figures. This may be due to the statistical methodology in use, as well as to a certain lack of rigor in compiling the relevant data. An analysis of educational characteristics of the Cuban population, possible trends in the dropout rate, and underlying causes for the latter, may be found in Jorge and Moncarz (1980: 76-82).

10. While Cuban-Americans comprise no less than a third of the student body in South Florida institutions of higher education, their representation as faculty and administrators is greatly limited. Similarly, in the Dade County school system, teachers of Latin origin account for but a small fraction of the total (Miami Herald, 1978c and 1985).

11. It has been widely publicized that, in the Dade County banking system, there are 16 presidents, 250 vice-presidents, and over 500 mid-level executives of Cuban origin (Miami Herald, 1981h). According to a report by Carlos Arboleya, Cubans in Dade County

> account for about 25,000 of the garment workers, close to 3,500 medical doctors in practice in Miami; half of the aircraft and maintenance people are Cuban. They own over 60 new and used car dealerships, have 500+ supermarkets (and) approximately 250 drugstores. In addition, Cuban-Americans are owners of many companies engaged in real estate, manufacturing, cigar-making, boat-building, sugar processing, aircraft maintenance and repair, etc., and are largely responsible for the booming international trade that is so beneficial to the area (Arboleya, 1980: 2).

The authors updated the statistics in Arboleya's 1985 report entitled *Miami's Cuban Community 25 Years Later*.

In contrast, Table C of the Appendix shows that, in 1978, about 23% of Cuban males 14 years of age and over earned less than $4000 a year, and close to 50% earned $10-25,000. For the population of Dade County as a whole, only about 14% of families made less than $5,000 in 1977 (Dade County, 1979: 5). Another report, also from the Dade County Planning Department, states on the very first page that 19% of Dade County residents were classified as poor in 1976 (Dade County, 1978). The Beacon Council called attention to an increase in poverty levels in Dade County between 1969 and 1979, in contrast to a decrease for the rest of Florida and for the United States as a whole. In all probability, the percentage of poverty is higher for Cubans because they include a higher proportion of elderly and the non-English-speaking than is true of the population at large and because of the bimodal income distribution, previously mentioned, in the Cuban population.

12. Undoubtedly, without the socio-cultural and economic innovation produced by the interaction between local resources and immigrant contributions, Miami would not have developed the comparative, even absolute, advantage it now enjoys in international markets. The mix of Anglo-American and Latin cultures was most effective in attracting, first, Latin Americans and then Western Europeans. The phenomenal growth in the volume of foreign trade that passed

through Customs District 52 over the past 20 years attests to the validity of this statement. For example, Customs District 52 accounted for 20% of US exports to Latin America in 1974; by 1978 this figure had increased to 31%. Aggregate exports from the district amounted to approximately US$6-billion in 1979, of which about 80% were destined for Latin America. Figures were reported by the Miami Herald (1980c and 1981l). Latin America's deep recession of the 1980s impacted the foreign sector of the local economy, but exports from South Florida were back at the US$6-billion level by 1984, after having suffered a slump in the preceding years (Lipner and Dutt, 1984; and Cruz, 1984).

13. A considerable literature is available in this field, to which José Szapocznik has made a major contribution, both in his own writings and in collaboration; see Szapocznik (1979 and 1981); Szapocznik, Scopetta, Kurtines and de Los Angeles Aranalde (1978a and 1978b); Szapocznik, Kurtines, and Hanna (1979); and Scopetta, King, Szapocznik, and Tillman (1979).

For further information on the serious dilemmas in adapting to multilingual and multicultural environments which confront Cubans of all ages and backgrounds, see Szapocznik, Kurtines, and Fernández (1980: 353-364); Szapocznik, Truss, and Daruna (1978); and Lasaga (1981).

14. By the time of Dade County's municipal elections of November 1983, Cuban voters had not yet managed to coalesce into a monolithic ethnic voting bloc. Cuban-American voters demonstrated a diversity of preferences, as can be seen by the fact that the incumbent mayor of the City of Miami, a non-Cuban, was able to carry with him an estimated third of the Cuban vote. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that his main opponent, a Cuban-American, *did* carry the substantial portion of the votes of that segment of the community. Another instance of voting pluralism took place in the election to fill a vacant seat on the board of city commissioners of the City of Miami, in which a black candidate obtained as much as quarter of the vote in some key Latin precincts (Miami Herald, 1981a, 1981b, 1981c, 1981d, 1981e, 1981f, 1981j, and 1981k; see also related articles 1982-85 *passim*).

15. On the issue of discrimination, see also Jorge, Cruz, Moncarz and Salazar-Carrillo (1981); Jorge and Moncarz (1985); and the Miami Herald (1985).

REFERENCES

ARBOLEYA, C. (1985) Miami's Cuban Community 25 Years Later. Miami, FL: C. Arboleya.

_____ (1980) The Cuban Community 1980. Miami, FL: C. Arboleya.

BACH, R. (1980) "The New Cuban Immigrants: Their Background and Prospects." Monthly Labor Review, 103, 10 (October): 39-46.

BACH, R., BACH, J., and T. TRIPLETT (1981) The Flotilla Entrants: Latest and Most Controversial. Binghamton, NY: State University of New York, Department of Sociology.

Beacon Council (1984a) Environmental Scan Report. Miami, FL: Beacon Council Economic Development Strategic Plan.

_____ (1984b) Environmental Scan Report, Executive Summary. Miami, FL: Beacon Council Economic Development Strategic Plan, March.

BALBONA, M. (1970) "Causal Factors in the Cuban Exodus." Paper presented at the 78th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Miami Beach, FL; September 3-8.

BONACICH, E. and J. MODELL (1980) The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

CASAL, L. and A. HERNANDEZ (1975) "Cubans in the U.S." Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos, 5, 2, (July): 25-51.

CLARK, J. (1985) Los Cubanos en los Estados Unidos. Unpublished.

_____ (1980) "El Exodo de 1980: Antecedentes y Motivaciones." Paper presented at the Second Congress of Cuban Intellectual Dissidents, held at Columbia University, New York, NY. August.

_____ (1978) The Cuban Exodus: Background, Evolution and Impact in the USA. Miami, FL: Union of Cubans in Exile. pp. 1-36.

_____ (1975) The Exodus from Revolutionary Cuba, 1959-1974: A Sociological Analysis. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL.

CRUZ, R. (1984) "The Impact of Foreign Trade on the Economy of South Florida: An Econometric Model Forecast," pp. 143-154 in Antonio Jorge and Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, (eds.) Trade, Debt and Growth in Latin America. New York, NY: Pergamon Press.

Dade County (FL) Planning Department (1980) Spanish-Owned Firms (Research Division Report) Miami, FL: Dade County (Florida) Planning Department.

_____ (1979) Dade County Facts (Research Division Report). Miami, FL: Dade County (Florida) Planning Department.

_____ (1978) Poverty Worsens in Dade County (Research Division Report) Miami, FL: Dade County (Florida) Planning Department.

Diario las Americas (1984) 27 March.

DIAZ, G. (ed.) (1980) Evaluation and Identification of Policy Issues in the Cuban Community. Miami, FL: Cuban National Planning Council.

FABRICIO, R. (1982) 9 January: Fabricio column.

FAGEN, R., BRODY, R., and T. O'LEARY (1968) Cubans in Exile. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

GODSELL, G. (1980) "The Cubans." Christian Science Monitor. 30 April: 11.

GREELEY, A. (1977) The American Catholic. New York, NY: Basic Books.

HECHTER, M. (1975) Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

JAFFE, A., CULLEN, R., and T. BOSWELL (1980) The Changing Demography of Spanish Americans. New York, NY: Academic Press.

JORGE, A. (1977) "Characteristics and Consequences of the Hispanic Economy in Miami before and after the Cuban Communist Revolution," pp. 141-155 in The Hispanic Presence in Florida. Miami, FL 1977: E.A. Seemann Publishing Co. Inc.

JORGE, A. and R. MONCARZ (1985) "Cubans in the Labor Market." Journal of the Southwestern Society of Economists, 12, 1: 64-80.

_____ (1981a) The Cuban Influx into South Florida: Culture, Entrepreneurship, and the Emergence of New Growth Patterns in an Advanced Society. San Antonio, TX: University of Texas at San Antonio.

_____ (1981b) "International Factor Movement and Complementarity." REMP Bulletin, September, Supplement 14. The Hague, Netherlands: Research Group for European Migration Problems.

_____ (1980) "Cubans in South Florida: A Social Science Approach." Metas 1, 3 (Fall).

JORGE, A, CRUZ, R., MONCARZ, R., and J. SALAZAR-CARRILLO (1981) "A Development Model for Modern Society." Discussion Paper in Economics and Banking. Miami, FL: Florida International University.

LASAGA, J. (1981) "¿Aculturación o Integración Cultural?" Verbum II, 1 (abril): 8-10.

_____ (1979) "Acculturation or Cultural Integration? Miami, FL: Miami Mental Health Center.

LIGHT, I. (1972) Ethnic Enterprise in America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

LIPNER, J.K. and A. DUTT (1984) South Florida as a Getaway to US Trade with Latin America (mimeograph). Miami, FL: Florida International University.

Miami Herald (1985) 23 May.

_____ (1981a) "Reboso's Forces Plan Cuban-Candidate Comeback." 15 November: 2B.

_____ (1981b) "Ferre's Big Victory Leaves Cubans at a Loss." 14 November: 7A.

_____ (1981c) "Ferre: Election Held Us Together." 13 November: 1C.

_____ (1981d) "Blacks and Non-Latin Whites Bar Cuban Domination of Commission." 11 November: 1A.

_____ (1981e) "Havana Cites the ¿Internationalist' Duty of Cubans." 4 November: 22A.

_____ (1981f) "Latin Turnout Gives Politics a New Accent." 2 November: 1B.

_____ (1981g) 25 October.

_____ (1981h) "Latins Courting Anglo Minority." 12 October: 4B.

_____ (1981i) "Beset by Woes, They're Cubans Disunited." 29 August: 1B.

_____ (1981j) "Dade Voter Rolls Disclose Trend: "Cubanization." 13 July.

_____ (1981k) "Cuba Will Try Exiles Accused of Hijacking." 12 July: 12A.

_____ (1981l) "CIA Playing with Fire on Anti-Castro Suport." 14 March: 6A.

_____ (1981m) 14 January:

_____ (1980a) "Dade Voters Split on Ethnic Lines on Bilingualism." 5 November: 11A.

_____ (1980b) "8,000 Seeking Freedom Jam Embassy in Havana." 7 April: 1A.

_____ (1980c) 21 March:

_____ (1978a) 19 March:

_____ (1978b) 17 March:

_____ (1978c) 1 February:

_____ (1978d) 29 January:

Miami News (1984) 12 December: 1-A, 4-A.

MONCARZ, R. (1969) A Study of the Effect of Environmental Change on Human Capital among Selected Skilled Cubans. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce.

MONCARZ, R. and A. JORGE (1982) "Cuban Integration into the United States," pp. 146-175 in D.L. Cuddy (ed.) Contemporary American Migration. Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers.

New York Times (1985) 31 March: Y-15.

PORTES, A., CLARK, J., and M. LOPEZ (1981-82) "Six Years, A Profile of the Process of Incorporation of Cuban Exiles in the United States," Cuban Studies, VII/N2-V12/N1 (July 1981-January 1982): 1-24.

SALTER, P. and R. MINGS (1972) "The Projected Impact of Cuban Settlements in Voting Patterns in Metropolitan Miami, Florida." The Professional Geographer 24, 2 (May): 123-131.

SCOPETTA, M.A., KING, O., SZAPOCZNIK, J., and W. TILLMAN (1979) Ecological Structural Family Therapy with Cuban Immigrant Families. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, Department of Psychiatry, Spanish Family Guidance Center.

Strategy Research Corporation (SRC) (1985) The 1985 South Florida Latin Market. Miami, FL: Strategy Research Corporation.

_____ (1984) US Hispanic Market 1984. Miami, FL: Strategy Research Corporation.

_____ (1980) The Dade Latin Market 1980. Miami, FL: Strategy Research Corporation.

SZAPOCZNIK, J. (1981) "Transcultural Processes in Mental Health: Concepts Relevant to Cuban Refugees." Paper presented at the Human Services Training Center Symposium on Transcultural Processes in Mental Health and Human Services Delivery to Cuban and Haitian Refugees, Miami, FL, 13 March (mimeo).

_____ (1979) "The Cuban Exile in the United States: Adjustment and Maladjustment." Paper presented at the Escuela Nacional de Estudios Profesionales, Acatlán, Mexico, May (mimeo).

SZAPOCZNIK, J., SCOPETTA, M. A., KURTINES, W., AND M. DE LOS ANGELES ARANALDE (1978a) "Theory and Measurement of Acculturation." Interamerican Journal of Psychology 12: 113-130.

_____ (1978b) "Cuban Value Structure: Treatment Implications." Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 46, 5 (October): 961-970.

SZAPOCZNIK, J., KURTINES, W., and T. FERNANDEZ (1980) "Bicultural Involvement and Adjustment in Hispanic-American Youths." International Journal of Intercultural Relations 14, 1: 353-365.

SZAPOCZNIK, J., KURTINES, W., and N. HANNA (1979) "Comparison of Cuban and Anglo-American Cultural Values in a Clinical Population." Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 43, 3 (June): 623-624.

SZAPOCZNIK, J., C. TRUSS, and P. DARUNA (1978) "Intergenerational Sources of Role Conflict in Cuban Mothers," pp. 41-66 in M. Montiel (ed.) Hispanic Families. Washington, DC: National Coalition of Hispanic Mental Health and Human Services Organizations.

THOMAS, J. (1967) "Cuban Refugees in the United States." The International Migration Review, 1, 2 (Spring): 46-57.

Time Magazine (1981a) 7 September: 11.

_____ (1981b) 18 May: 27.

US Commerce Department. Bureau of the Census. (USCD-Census) (1985) "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1982," Current Population Report 396 (Series P-20). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1982) "Money and Poverty Status and Families and Persons in the US: 1981." Current Population Report 134 (Series P-60), July. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1981a) "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: October 1980." Current Population Report (Series P-20). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1981b) "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1980." Current Population Report 361 (Series P-20). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1981c) "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1979." Current Population Report 354 (Series P-20). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1980) "Population Profile of the United States: 1979." Current Population Report 350 (Series P-20). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1977) Surveys of Minority Owned Business Enterprises; Minority Owned Business, Spanish Origin. ME-77-2. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1976) Economic and Population Census: 1976 Survey of Income and Education. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1972a) Surveys of Minority Owned Business Enterprises; Minority Owned Business, Spanish Origin. MB-72-2. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

_____ (1972b) Census Tracts, Final Report (PH-1-129) Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

US Health, Education and Welfare Department (US-HEW) (1981) Cuban Refugees Program. Fact Sheet; Five Phases of the Program, 31 March. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

US Labor Department. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (US-BLS) (1981) Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 1980. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies (UM-CAIS) (1967) The Cuban Migration 1959-1966 and its Impact on Miami, Dade County, Florida. Coral Gables, FL: UM-CAIS.

WONG, E. (1973) "Political Orientation and Participation of Cuban Migrants, A Preliminary Analysis." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, September 4-8.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Antonio Jorge

Dr. Jorge is Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University and Senior Research Scholar at the Institute of Interamerican Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. He has published numerous books and articles on Latin American economic development, trade, and external debt. Dr. Jorge has also published extensively on the economy of Cuba, and on Hispanics in the United States.

Raul Moncarz

Dr. Moncarz is Professor of Economics at Florida Intenational University. His primary field of interest is money and banking, and he is well known for his research on Central America and on Hispanics in the United States. Dr. Moncarz has also published extensively on Cubans in South Florida.

UNIVERSITY OF
Miami
A GLOBAL UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
P.O. BOX 248123
CORAL GABLES, FL 33124